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FASHIONING A POST-COLONIAL SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION
by
James V. Spickard
Introduction
This is a talk about tools.  Not research methods, though those seemingly innocent 
techniques are as steeped in politics as anything else, but intellectual tools: the 
concepts and images with which contemporary sociology greets the world.  We all know 
that such concepts channel our thinking.  Yet, we do not always appreciate how much 
they limit it.  For generations, we sociologists have presumed that our ideas are 
universal.  Just as 19th-century missionaries carried the Bible to benighted natives, we 
haul our statistical charts, our interview techniques, and our sense of religious agency 
around the globe, explaining as we go.  “Here’s some secularization,” we exclaim.  
“That’s a typical charismatic movement.”  “Over there we have a religious bureaucracy 
dealing with the dilemmas of institutionalization.”  Depending on our theoretical bent, we 
posit universal rational choice, or patterns of religious evolution, or structural analyses 
of ritual.  Like the missionaries, we bring the Truth to light Other’s lives.
I do not need to prove for this audience the affinity of 19th century missionaries 
and colonialists.  Like the missionaries, colonial administrators also took their Truth to 
aid the natives: the rule of law, efficient and honest administration, along with the 
scientific agriculture that was supposed to raise living standards under Euro-American 
rule.  Though the West arguably underdeveloped Africa, Asia, and the rest of its colonial 
possessions (note that "underdeveloped" is here an active verb),1 colonial 
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administration was intended to produce better life through better government.  Euro-
American scientific knowledge put key tools in colonial hands.
Sociology, of course, was one of those tools – another point I need not 
demonstrate today.  Both sociology and anthropology were, as Edward Said observed, 
among the schemes by which colonial administrators could “know [the Orientals] and 
what is good for them better than they [the Orientals] could possibly know for 
themselves”.2  Said’s critique of Orientalism batters sociology because, like that 19th 
century discipline, sociology provided colonial powers “with a vocabulary, imagery, 
rhetoric, and figures”3 that supported their domination.  One need only recall W.W. 
Rostow’s claim that “the stages of economic growth” require Westernizing elites to 
transform traditional economies,4 to see how Western social science aided Western 
hegemony.
Such academic colonialism is now out of favor, and for good reason.  Not only 
does science presume an open society.5   More importantly, anti-colonial political 
movements have sensitized intellectuals to the uses to which their ideas are put.  One 
does not have to be American to recoil from the attempted (mis)use of social science to 
control the Vietnamese.6  The Belgian political racialization of Rwanda was a 
necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for the recent genocide there.7  As much 
as we scholars like our innocence, our ideas have consequences, sometimes deadly 
ones – a fact that anti-colonialists have noted often.
My lecture is not an anti-colonialist enterprise, however, for I wish to do more 
than react to Western world domination.8  Instead, I seek a “post-colonial” sociology: a 
world sociology that joins the Western sociological tradition to other systems of thought, 
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in the hope of better empirical understanding.  If colonization involves one society’s 
political domination of another – with its concordant domination of economic, literary, 
cultural, and intellectual spheres – then “post-colonialism” is obviously something that 
comes afterwards.  The post-colonial imagination presumes colonialism’s end, if not in 
brute fact at least in spirit.  That is, though we doubtless still live in a colonial world – or 
at least a neo-colonial one – we can, at this historical juncture, begin to imagine its 
passing.  Post-colonial sociology opposes past, present, and future colonialisms but 
refuses to limit itself to such opposition.  It imagines a world free of colonial fetters, 
though scarred by the marks that they have left.  In this, it is a lot like coming to 
adulthood: one’s scars remind one of one’s responsibilities.  
How must we conceive social life, if we are to acknowledge the sins of the past, 
including our lingering tendency to dominate others?  What would a world society 
without this domination look like?  This is the task that a post-colonial sociology sets for 
itself.  
Though not as mired in politics as, for example, the sociology of development, 
the sociology of religion has also embraced several limited and destructive concepts.  
Max Weber’s sociology of action, for example, misrepresents “traditional” action, which 
prevents it from understanding much of the world’s religious behavior. Rational choice 
theories of religion similarly universalize an historically unique individualism, redefining 
behavior to fit an extremely limited model of the person.  I have elsewhere criticized 
these theories at length,9 so I shall not do so again here.  
Instead, I shall be more constructive.  From the various alternative sociologies 
with which I have been working – Confucian, Moslem, and Native American – I shall 
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extract two concepts to discuss today.  These are the Confucian idea of the relational 
self and Ibn Khaldûn’s concept of Al 'Assabiyya.  Each shows great promise for 
reformulating the sociology of religion in a more inclusive mode.  Along with other 
concepts, these ideas may help us move beyond the intellectual colonialism in which 
sociology in general – and the sociology of religion in particular – has been mired.
Before beginning, I must say a few words about the work of Bryan S. Turner.10  
He, who has contributed so much to social theory, to the sociology of religion, and to the 
understanding of Moslem societies, warns us against treating non-Western social 
theories as somehow ‘more authentic’, just because they are not ours.  As he points 
out, for example, Ibn Khaldûn’s work “does not offer a very useful analysis of late, 
industrial urban civilizations,”11 an interpretation with which I generally agree.
But I am trying something different.  Though a theory may not analyze some 
things well, it may very well help us comprehend others.  We need not embrace all of a 
thinker’s ideas to explore some of them.  Though Ibn Khaldûn does not help us 
understand industrialism, he does help us understand social solidarity.  If we 
concentrate only on the first, we are surprised by instances of the second – as the 
recent reemergence of European ethnic conflict proves.  I am no anti-colonialist, arguing 
for the greater integrity of non-Western viewpoints.  I am a post-colonialist seeking to 
combine ‘the West’ with ‘the Rest’, to make a more useful whole.  I present the 
Confucian relational self and Al ‘Assabiyya to you because they force us to ask 
questions about religion and social life that we did not ask before.  
Part I: The Confucian Relational Self
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Max Weber’s sociology is built on a four-fold typology of action, of which only two are 
explored in his empirical work.  Zweckrationalität and Wertrationalität, the equivalents of 
utilitarian and deontological ethics, are both conceived as individual orientations.12  
That is, like their corresponding ethics, they guide persons, not groups.  The same is 
true of traditional action, which subordinates individuals to the past, and affective action, 
which subordinates them to their desires.  All four types of action treat individuals as the 
key unit of social analysis.13 
Confucian social philosophy, on the other hand, begins not with the individual but 
with the group.  It presents a much different notion of self than is found either in Weber 
or in most other Western social thought.  It is captured in a masterful passage by Henry 
Rosemont, which I paraphrase as follows:14
If I could ask the shade of Confucius "who am I?" his reply, I believe, 
would run roughly as follows: You are James Vernon Spickard, the son of 
Donald and Mary Alice Spickard, named in joint memory of their best 
friend (James) and of Donald’s father (Vernon).  You are thus first, 
foremost, and most basically a son; you stand in a relationship to your 
parents that began at birth, has had a profound effect on your own and 
their later lives as well, and it is a relationship that is diminished only in 
part at their death.
Of course, now I am many other things besides a son.  I am husband to 
my wife, father of my children, uncle to a rather large assortment of other 
children; I am a brother, my friend's friend, my neighbor's neighbor; I am a 
teacher of my students, student of my teachers, colleague of my 
colleagues.
All of this is obvious, but note how different it is from focusing on me as a 
purely rational, autonomous individual.  For the early Confucians there can 
be no Me in isolation, to be considered abstractly: instead, I am the totality 
of roles I live in relation to specific others.  Moreover, these roles are 
interconnected in that the relations in which I stand to some people affect 
directly the relations in which I stand with others, to the extent that it would 
be misleading to say that I "play" or "perform" these roles; on the contrary, 
for Confucius I am my roles.  Taken collectively, these roles weave, for 
each of us, a unique pattern of personal identity, such that if some of my 
roles change, others will of necessity change also, literally making me a 
different person.  Marriage made me a different person, as did becoming a 
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father; the death of my first wife and my subsequent remarriage each 
made me a different person also. 
Rosemont (here modified) paints a particularly thorough picture of the relational self: the 
centerpiece of Confucian social thought. That thought does not begin with isolated 
individuals.  Instead, it sees the individual as a node of intersecting relationships.  While 
recognizing individual action, it focuses on relationships, not essences.  This creates a 
distinctly unWestern social vision. What are the implications of this kind of self for the 
religious life?  How does a connected rather than an isolated self change religion's 
social side?
(Like Rosemont, I build my picture from the Confucianism of the classic period.  
A more nuanced view would have to take into account each of several varieties of 
Confucianism – at the very least the classical Confucianism codified in the Han period, 
the neo-Confucianism of the 11th century C.E., and the neo-neo-Confucianism of the 
late 19th century.15)
Let us look for a moment at classic Confucianism's two most famous points of 
interaction between the divine and human worlds.  Both "ancestor worship" and "the 
Mandate of Heaven" are fundamentally relational, and thus operate in a different mode 
than do Western forms of spirituality.16
"Ancestor worship" is, of course, a bit of a misnomer.  Ancestors were not “gods” 
to the early Confucians, nor were they primarily of supernatural importance.  They were 
not individualized beings set over against individual worshippers.  Instead they were a 
collective: “the ancestors”.  They located the self in a family and lineage, anchored that 
self in the past and connected it to the future.  “Worshipping” them meant to remember 
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who one was: son or daughter of X, grandson or granddaughter of Y, and so on.  It was 
to house one in a nexus of related kin.  
Indeed, “ancestor worship” was the source of good character – an idea repellent 
to the individualized West.  C.K. Yang17 tells the story of a Chinese college boy, who, 
when accosted by a Baptist missionary and urged to repent of his sins, replied:
I come of reputable ancestry, I have a good conscience, and I have 
always been strict about my moral responsibilities and conduct.  How is it 
that I am full of sin?  
Note that "reputable ancestry" came first.  One's family determined who one was, for 
good or for ill.  Coming from a good family was equaled only by carrying well the family 
honor. “Worshipping” one’s ancestors means bringing to memory one's stream of 
relationships, going backwards and forwards in time. 
The Chinese notion of "the Mandate of Heaven" was similarly relational, but on a 
political, not a familial, level.  From the Shang period (1560?-1066? BCE), China was 
ruled by kings whose authority depended on a traditional but evolving set of 
relationships with the min: their laboring but non-slave subjects.  The ruler was to care 
for the min, at least in part because Heaven (Ti) holds them in special regard.  When 
the Chou dynasty (1066-771 BCE) replaced the Shang and instituted a more formal 
feudal system, they developed the idea that the mandate of Heaven (t'ien-ming) could 
pass from one ruler to another, depending on the ruler's virtue (te).  "Te is not the will of 
God but the ability to hold on to the rule by following the advice of one's ancestors."18  
This involved treating the people well so that they would support the ruler.  As one of 
the ancient texts put it, "Heaven sees through the seeing of people, Heaven hears 
through the hearing of people".19
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Just as “ancestor worship” is not like Western worship, the belief in t'ien-ming is 
not like the Western notion of "following the will of God."  The latter is active and, if the 
Hebrew Bible is taken literally, not always ethically oriented.20  Te is supremely ethical, 
and t'ien-ming even justifies rebellion in case the ruler forgets his obligations to care for 
the people.  The Mandate of Heaven is thus not an individual matter; it enforces the 
proper care of the community and is meaningless outside of that communal context – 
including for the lives of individuals.  Few Christians would say that God is meaningless 
outside of the community of believers, and those who do would be deemed heretics by 
their fellows.  For Confucians, this anti-individualism is the normal state of affairs.
These are, of course, only a few elements of the Confucian world view, 
inadequately explored.  Chinese philosophy is as subtle as the West's but built 
differently.  Yet there is enough here to suggest how a Confucian sociology of religion 
would differ from the Western one to which we are accustomed.
First, it is clear that in Confucian eyes, religion is not church religion.  While there 
are religious specialists, temples, public rituals and the like, most Chinese “religion” is 
fully integrated into daily life.  Family-centered ritual is private, and the assorted healers, 
geomancers, and so on – all of whom incorporate religion into their work – are hired for 
private ends.  Religion does not center itself on Sunday morning public worship, and 
much that resembles that worship is formally either Buddhist or Taoist (though both 
have operated under the Confucian umbrella for several centuries).  In short, to study 
religion in China is to study popular religion – and not just during the recent Communist 
hegemony.  “Ancestor worship”, “superstition”, semi-divine popular saints – these are 
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the dramatis personae of the Chinese religious universe.  A Confucian sociology of 
religion would have to organize itself accordingly.
Second, the unit of religious analysis is not the individual: neither the individual's 
beliefs, nor the individual's actions, nor the individual's choices (rational or otherwise).  
A Confucian sociology of religion would begin from relationship, and ask how religion – 
popular and organizational, private and public – creates and sustains the relationships 
that constitute human social life.  More exactly, it would look at the place of ritual and of 
various beings in the web of social life that reaches seamlessly from human to divine.  
How is each being in this web constituted, and what are the consequences of this 
mutual constitution for daily life?  The exact questions are less important for our 
purposes than the Confucian presumption that individuals come second, not first.
Third, the Confucian approach undercuts the distinction between the “secular” 
and the “religious” spheres; it calls into question the supposed line between “the sacred” 
and “the profane”.  Scholars have long argued whether Confucianism is truly a religion, 
as it places persons, not gods at the center of its world.21  Pan Jianxiong notes that folk 
sayings like "the way of Heaven is far and the way of human beings is near," and "pay 
homage to the demons and gods but keep far away from them" are quite ancient and 
widespread.22  Many see Confucianism as an ethical, not a religious, philosophy.
Yet, this distinction is ethnocentric.  Confucianism posits an integrated world of 
mutually-constituting relationships, each involving ritual propriety (li) and virtue (te) vis-
a-vis the others; the sum total of these relationships constitutes each of its nodes, 
whether human or divine.  As such, religiosity or secularization is not the issue.  The 
Confucian universe is neither enchanted nor disenchanted, but oriented toward li and te, 
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under the aegis of t'ien-ming.  As the recent Communist Chinese efforts to re-embrace 
Confucianism show, not all that much has necessarily changed over the centuries.23
Chinese religion requires a different approach to “tradition” than is found in 
Weberian sociology – or in other Western sociologies, for that matter.  It was 
“traditional” not because it hewed to established patterns but because it placed great 
emphasis on nurturing the web of relationships that constitute both social life and 
individuals.  Weber, with his individualistic bias, did not see this, and so emphasized the 
“Caesaropapism” of the Chinese regime.24  A Confucian sociology of religion begin its 
analysis of religious life by tracing the ways in which relationships constitute the self 
rather than merely complementing it.  It would integrate ethics and sociology far more 
thoroughly than we do.  Such an approach would not just understand Chinese society 
better; it would also have much to say to the West.
Part II: Al 'Assabiyya
Now let us move a third of the way around the world, to 14th century Tunis, the 
birthplace of ‘Abd-ar-Rahmân Abû Zaid Walî-ad-Dîn Ibn Khaldûn.  The son and 
grandson of minor court officials and scholars, he followed the family profession to 
Morocco and Spain, where he played – and lost – many a political intrigue.  After years 
of struggle, he came to believe that wise rulership had little influence on human history, 
and that states rise and fall from impersonal forces.  His Kitâb al-'Ibar, or "World 
History,” traces these forces through several centuries of Moslem history.25
Ibn Khaldûn saw history as a cyclic struggle between barbarism and civilization – 
“tribes” and “cities,” to use a popular shorthand. "Badâwah" – “bedouinity” or “desert 
attitude” – typifies nomads, who live a rude and savage life and are forced by their 
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harsh desert surroundings to endure with little and work hard for what they get.  
Individuals cannot survive here, and are thus of no consequence.  The tribe works as a 
unit, especially in response to outside threats.  Compelled to unity, courage, and 
fortitude, its members support each other against all comers.26
"Hatharah" – “sedentarisation” – on the other hand, typifies settled peoples, who 
are stable and rich.  Agriculture, trading, and such livelihoods let them accumulate 
wealth.  The resulting softer living leaves more room for individuality.  People think more 
of themselves and less of their neighbors, turning to magistrates and rulers to defend 
them both against their fellow citizens and against hostile outsiders.  They depend on 
laws, not persons.  In short, their living makes them less unified, so that they need 
social organizations for support.27
Ibn Khaldûn argued that these two social types live in tension with each other.  
Harsh life makes tribes unified and fierce, which enables them to conquer their less 
unified neighbors.  On doing so, they become rulers, who settle down and take on the 
civilized habits of their subjects.  (Who, after all, would willingly stay in the desert?)  
After a few generations of sedentary life, they lose their unity, and so fall to the next 
wave of barbarians.  Ibn Khaldûn saw the history of his native Maghreb, of Islam, and 
indeed of the Mediterranean world since Roman times as a cyclical history of conquest.  
Tribes overwhelmed cities, became civilized, and were overwhelmed by other tribes in 
their turn.
What distinguishes tribes from settled people is their differing Al 'Assabiyya.28 
Usually translated as "group-feeling,” "esprit de corps,” or "spirit of kinship,” Al 
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'Assabiyya denotes the emotion that leads group members to support one another.  
Derived from the Arabic root 'assab, "to bind,”
Ibn Khaldûn uses it to mean blood relationship in general, partisanship for 
the blood relatives, mutual partisanship and the vital force of a tribe or 
people which is expressed in common will.29
This group-feeling is, at first, external or defensive – the functional equivalent for 
nomads of the fortresses and armies of city folk.  Lacking economic resources and even 
a secure livelihood, nomads must depend on their group or die.  Yet, this way of 
phrasing it turns Ibn Khaldûn on his head, for it is the city dwellers’ lack of Al ‘Assabiyya 
that brings about their downfall.  Not only do city folk lack the personal fortitude found 
among nomads, they also lack their strong group-feeling and common will.  This makes 
it harder for them to respond to emergencies, which leads to their eventual defeat.  Law 
and armies compensate somewhat for weak Al 'Assabiyya, but they cannot replace it.  
Nomads’ superior group-feeling and lack of regard for outsiders allows them a single-
minded brutality that ultimately prevails.
Though both theorized social solidarity, Ibn Khaldûn was no Durkheimian.  He 
put forward a very different image of social solidarity than Durkheim proposed, 
especially in The Division of Labor.30   Both scholars posit two polar types of society 
based on people's means of livelihood, but Al 'Assabiyya is not mechanical solidarity – 
far from it.  Where Durkheim saw simpler societies tied together by external laws and 
compulsion, Ibn Khaldûn saw tribes as knit from within.  Where Durkheim saw complex 
societies as strengthened by their internal interdependence, Ibn Khaldûn saw them as 
weakened by their lack of common will.  Most notably, where Durkheim found social 
solidarity problematic for simpler peoples, tracing what they have to common ideas, Ibn 
Khaldûn saw tribes as stable and tied together by feelings.  Solidarity’s emotional side 
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appears in Durkheim's later work, where it supports the sacred ideas that he says prop 
up the social order.31  For Ibn Khaldûn, the emotional bond comes first; ideas may 
support it, but also undercut it – and are secondary in any case.32
Nowhere is the contrast stronger than in the role each thinker saw for religion.  
Durkheim thought that religion creates the social solidarity that is crucial for simpler 
societies, which might otherwise fall apart.  Ibn Khaldûn found tribal solidarity 
unproblematic, but saw a role for religion in the transition to civilized life.  Islam, he said, 
could counteract a group's particularism, lending it the strength and unity that it needs to 
triumph.33
This view is worth developing in some detail.  Ibn Khaldûn called the early Arabs 
the most barbarous of peoples, because their life as camel herders kept them in the 
most nomadic condition.  They thus had strong group-feeling, courage, and fortitude, 
but were the most remote from civilization.  Their group-feeling was limited to blood 
relations, and their warfare produced pillage and ruin, not empire.34
Islam, with its emphasis on good conduct and discipline, helped overcome this 
savagery.  It expanded Arab group-feeling to encompass more than kin, allowing the 
growth of royal authority (which Ibn Khaldûn saw as the natural result of group-feeling).  
This would normally have lowered Arab Al 'Assabiyya, yet Islam kept it high.  The 
group-feelings of various tribes and clans did not vanish, but were submerged into a 
wider unity that made the Arab Empire possible.  Prophetic religion proved to be a good 
proxy for kinship – and a stronger force than city-dwellers’ armies and laws.35
Soon, though, the natural decline of group-feeling set in.  Having conquered, the 
Arabs took on civilized habits and lost their Al ‘Assabiyya.  City life lowered their 
“Fashioning a Post-Colonial Sociology” Final Version
Page 15
common will below the point that Islam made any difference.  Their empire split into 
kingdoms, whose dynasties rose and fell with the rise and fall of various tribal 
solidarities.  Seljuqs, Almoravids, Turks, Berbers, and others came to power and then 
were absorbed or swept away in the pattern of invasion and conquest that Ibn Khaldûn 
traced back 1000 years.  Religious group-feeling came to be but one among scores of 
group-feelings that typified the ethnically and territorially diverse Moslem world.  
Regimes rose or fell, peoples triumphed or faded away in a complex dance of these 
many 'Assabiyyat.36 
Ibn Khaldûn’s work is thus not just a history of nomadic conquest; it is the first 
sociology of a multi-ethnic society, one in which religion played a key but varied role.  
Ibn Khaldûn saw religion as a parallel means of solidarity, alongside kinship, ethnicity, 
place, and so on.  All were active in both tribes and cities, but in different strengths and 
combinations.  As we shall we below, treating such factors under the same rubric 
encourages a nuanced analysis of their interrelationships.
What kind of sociology of religion can be erected on this base?  I shall mention 
two aspects here.
First, as in the Confucian approach outlined above, a Khaldûnian sociology of 
religion is not grounded in individuals.  Individuals do not appear in the Kitâb, except as 
exemplars of social processes. They are mere counters in the social game, pawns in 
the hands of larger forces.  An individual’s religiosity; her or his beliefs; her or his 
personal choices: it is not through such things that religion influences events. Instead, 
Ibn Khaldûn points to the role of group-feelings, which often submerge individuals in the 
mass of their co-religionists.
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As Islam was for the Arabs a unifying force, able to overcome (for a time) the 
natural decline in city-dwellers’ group-feeling, so other religions have their own 
Assabiyyat.  A Khaldûnian would find ways to gauge religious group-feelings as social 
phenomenon, would explore their waxes and wanes, and would study their interactions 
with their familial, ethnic, and regional counterparts. For example: is the decline in 
American mainline religion an outgrowth of their liberalism and their lost strictness as 
argued by Finke and Stark?37  Or is it a result of a soft city-dwelling life that reduces 
group-feeling in general, plus a religious predictability that does not reverse such natural 
trends?  A Khaldûnian would explore the latter possibility, seeing such things as the 
American Methodists’ loss of “market share” as less the result of individual and 
organizational choices than as the product of changing life patterns that lessen 
Assabiyyat in general.
(I note in passing that Stark and his colleagues have no direct measure of 
religious solidarity.  Instead, they use church membership and participation, which may 
measure quite different things in different times and places.)
But there is more.  Not only does Ibn Khaldûn not ground his sociology in 
individuals; he allows us to predict where individuals (as a social phenomenon) will 
occur.  He argues that they will only appear where group-feeling is weak.  In tribes, 
writes Mahmoud Dhaouadi, 
the individual can hardly acquire personal interests within the boundaries 
of Al 'Assabiyya. In tribal society a person can only assert his or her 
individuality through Al 'Assabiyya.  In the words of Al-Jabri, the 'I' of Al 
'Assabiyya is equal to the 'I' of each of its members.38 
In cities, however, the situation is much different: there, lowered group-feeling allows 
individuality.  People become distinct from one another, religiously as well as socially.  
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Their individual religious leanings, their diverse belief-systems, and their insistence on 
choosing their religious paths are a result, for Ibn Khaldûn, of a settled life that lessens 
group identity.  A Khaldûnian sociology of religion would see the growth and decline of 
such individualism as the product of underlying social ties, whose strength or weakness 
is in turn the effect of specific ways of living.39  In short, religious individualism is a 
social product, to be explained rather than assumed.
Though this paints a very different picture of secularization than we are used to, I 
do not wish to propose yet another revision of that concept.40  Essentially a 
contemporary form of the Enlightenment belief that reason replaces religion, 
secularization as a concept separates religion from the rest of life and the sociology of 
religion from the rest of sociology.  Focusing on it prevents us from seeing what unites 
religion with the rest of the social world.
Let us therefore take another tack, which leads us to the second aspect of a 
Khaldûnian approach.  Though scholars study religion, and scholars study ethnicity,41 
these are seldom the same scholars – and if they are, they seldom bring the same 
concepts to bear on both interests.  True, scholars study ethnic churches and ethnics in 
churches, and scholars have long recognized the ethnic origins of some American 
denominations.42  But they do not conceive of both kinds of identity in the same way.
To be specific: religions are usually thought of in terms of beliefs and 
organizations – i.e., as ideas that people hold, or as organizations to which they belong, 
both of which are in a sense “voluntary.”  Despite some recent work on the social 
construction of ethnic identity,43 ethnicity is usually seen as an intrinsic property of the 
person – i.e., as something “involuntary.”  Thus, survey research often asks for one’s 
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ethnicity and for one’s current religion.  It may conceivably ask for one’s “religious 
history” – i.e., a listing of the various religions to which one has at one or another time 
belonged.  A parallel question about one’s “ethnic history,” however, would most likely 
elicit one’s ancestors’ ethnicities, not a record of the various ethnicities one has held 
during one’s own lifetime.  Imagine someone answering:  “I was raised White, then 
spent ten years being Black before becoming Asian.”  Such an answer seems absurd, 
though it may accurately depict someone of Pakistani extraction raised in the United 
States (where Pakistanis are classed as “White”), who moves to Britain (where they are 
considered “Black” but are struggling to be seen as “Asian”).44  Our sense of absurdity 
at this is a sign that we see ethnicity as an attribute, not a choice; despite the quasi-
permanence of religious identity for Jews and Catholics, we typically see religion the 
other way around.
This difference has been institutionalized in law.  Ethnicity’s “inevitability” has 
won ethnic groups legal protection and – in some circumstances – communal 
recognition.  Britain, for example, protects ethnic groups against discrimination and in 
some cases grants them communal representation on local councils.  It does not do this 
for religious groups, with the exception of Jews and Sikhs, who are protected because 
of their putative ethnicity.  It specifically does not protect British Muslims as Muslims, 
despite the fact that they suffer discrimination for their religion as much as for their 
origins.
This has spawned a Muslim identity movement in Britain, which, notes Tariq 
Modood, has “thrown British multiculturalism into theoretical and practical disarray.” 45  
The very proponents of ethnic-minority identity politics have opposed Muslims who seek 
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parity with other disadvantaged groups.  Some opposition stems from the Rushdie 
affair; some results from Islam’s supposed anti-feminism.  Those who once spoke for 
the public relevance of gender and ethnic identities – by criticizing liberalism’s relegation 
of such identities to the private sphere – now deny the public relevance of religious 
identity.46
This controversy would not occur were religion and ethnicity seen with 
Khaldûnian eyes. Identities, to Ibn Khaldûn, are not an attribute of persons but of 
groups.  That is, they are a function of group Al 'Assabiyya, whose weakness or 
strength is always an empirical matter.  In some circumstances, people feel more 
attachment to ethnic groups and so identify with their ethnicity; in other circumstances, 
their religious adherence comes to the fore.  Some identify themselves foremost as 
women and men; others find such identities trivial.  No such identity is essential, for 
each depends on activated social support.  Can one imagine a politicized women’s 
identity without a Women’s Movement?  Or a Latino identity without activists 
emphasizing their Latino (as opposed to Chicano, Cubano, Dominicano, Puerto 
Riqueño, Tejano, or simple American) heritage?  The nature of such identities varies 
across time and society.  Their strength is a function of group activities, which also vary.  
And they all – ethnic, gender, religious, etc. – are of a type: they rise or fall because of 
group-feeling.47
Ibn Khaldûn saw no difference between ethnic and religious Al 'Assabiyya in his 
native Maghreb; both kinds of group-feeling were present in various strengths at various 
times and places.  Furthermore, they were not mutually exclusive: such feelings cut 
across one another as often as they coincided.  Thus rulers had to deal with the 
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mobilization (or potential mobilization) of people based on ethnicity, kinship, religion, 
locality, and a whole host of other factors, which often set people against those who had 
previously been their allies.  Arabs might face Berber rebellion, which they could 
undercut either by dividing Berbers along kin lines or by emphasizing the Islam that all 
held in common.  Such strategies might or might not work, depending on the 
'Assabiyyat involved.  Ibn Khaldûn described these processes, but saw their outcome as 
always an empirical matter.  In his refusal to privilege any one Al 'Assabiyya, he was as 
anti-essentialist as any post-modern thinker.
Such ideas shed light on recent Balkan conflicts, over whose causes scholars 
have argued at length.  While all agree that Balkan politicians have “played the 
communal card”, there is considerable controversy over whether the key distinctions are 
“ethnic” or “religious”.48  After all, the differences between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian 
“Muslims” amount to small bits of vocabulary and the religious services which each 
does not attend.  Are the recent Bosnian and Kosovar wars best understood as ethnic 
(somehow “inevitable”) or as religious (“voluntary”) fighting?
Ibn Khaldûn would see this as a false dichotomy.  What matters is not the source 
of Al 'Assabiyya, but its strength and results.  Clearly, “Croats,” “Serbs,” and “Muslims” 
lived together in relative peace for hundreds of years; clearly they have not lived 
peacefully for major parts of the last century.  At least some of their recent discord 
stems from an international political system that imagines national states as pure ethnic 
communities.49  Ibn Khaldûn wrote in an age in which such purity was scarcely to be 
conceived: a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society in which politics depended on variable 
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group-feeling.  He encourages us to seek the source of religious and ethnic conflict alike 
in such group-feelings – and to recognize those feelings’ social origins.50
Conclusion
What do such ideas do for the sociology of religion?  The concepts of human 
relationalism and group-feeling are not beyond the Western ken, though they have not 
been central to Western sociologies.  Like all ideas, they help us focus on certain 
aspects of social life while hiding others.  A Confucian approach to religion, for example, 
grounds tradition in present relationships, not past memories; it emphasizes the social 
ties that constitute the self; and it subordinates that self to larger patterns of li and te 
(“ritual propriety” and “virtue”).  A Khaldûnian sociology also sees wider patterns: the 
role of group-feeling in social life, its dependence on the concrete system of livelihood, 
its rise and inevitable dissipation, its potential multidimensionality.
Each view ignores certain important things.  Neither has much to say about 
religious organizations, though neither is entirely silent on the subject.  Each 
subordinates religious beliefs to other factors.  Sociologists of religion should not give 
up these topics, for they have been fertile grounds for investigation.
Yet, each view asks new questions as well.  From the Confucian side, we might 
ask: Why (and when) do people seek continuity as well as change in religion?  What is 
the relationship between sociability and virtue?  What is the relationship between formal 
and popular religion, and what are the social consequences of each?  Such matters 
have received little attention in the West; indeed, the Western emphasis on 
organizations and individuals has all but made them seem unsociological.  
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On the other side, a Khaldûnian might ask: How is religious solidarity like and 
different from other forms of human solidarity?  Under what social circumstances does 
religious individualism develop?  Decline?  How does religious solidarity interact with 
other solidarities: ethnic, national, familial?  Are these even different?  Or can they be 
seen through a common lens?  Such questions draw the sociology of religion back to 
the centers of recent sociological concern.
But there is more, as the Khaldûnian connection between religion and ethnic 
nationalism makes clear.  A recent article in the newsletter of the American 
Anthropological Association noted that academic anthropology’s attempt to unite 
cultural anthropology, physical anthropology, linguistics and archaeology into one 
discipline began as part of a 19th century nationalist project, for which ethnic nation-
states were each supposed to be distinguished by culture, race, language, and 
history.51  Benedict Anderson has shown how the printing press, the grammar book, 
the map and the museum – alongside anthropology – helped create the modern ethnic 
nation.52  Hannah Arendt showed us long ago how beliefs in ethnicity wedded to 
nationalism produced death and terror.53  These scholars remind us that ideas create 
social reality as well as describe it, though ideas’ influence often travels unexpected 
paths.
The same is true of contemporary sociological ideas!  Current sociology treats 
religions either as individual meaning systems or as organizations (churches, 
synagogues, mosques, and so on), both of which are increasingly conceived as part of 
private, not public, life.  Is it any surprise that, to use Stephen Carter’s phrase, public life 
in the modern West is a “culture of disbelief”?54  The issue of state-church vs folk-
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church is alive in the Nordic countries; yet, as several papers at this conference have 
shown, citizens increasingly see religion as most relevant to private life, and most think 
of it in institutional and individual terms.  Is it surprising that we are puzzled by societies 
in which religion manifests itself differently?  Mainstream Western ideas have 
marginalized religion, and Western reality has followed suit.  What would be the 
practical consequence for religion if we no longer thought of it just in individual, 
organizational, and private terms?  Would social life be different if we saw religion as a 
core means of social solidarity, in the way that we now treat ethnicity?  Would it be 
different if we saw religion as embedded in relationships – in the ritual proprieties that 
actualize human virtue?
I cannot, of course, answer these questions here.  They must be asked, 
however, for ideas are not just the spectacles through which we see the world, though 
they are certainly that.  They also help constitute that world.  The promise of a post-
colonial sociology is not just that we might now see with non-Western eyes; it is that we 
might overcome in practice the oppressive legacy of our past.  Ideas matter.  They are 
an important pole in the dialectic that constitutes social life.  A post-colonial sociology 
must not shrink from its duty to think them through.
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